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caution that he ought.”  Id.
2. See id.
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Flouting Faretta: The Supreme Court’s Failure to Adopt a
Coherent Communication Standard of Competency and the
Threat to Self-Representation After Indiana v. Edwards
I. Introduction
It is now axiomatic that a criminal defendant cannot stand trial unless he is
competent to do so.1  This rule is not a recent creation, but grounded in the
common law.2  In Dusky v. United States, the Supreme Court articulated the
current standard for determining competency to stand trial: the criminal
defendant must have “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and possess “a rational as well
as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”3  In Faretta v.
California, the Court held that a criminal defendant in a state proceeding has
a constitutional right to knowingly refuse the aid of counsel and proceed pro
se.4  In Indiana v. Edwards, the subject of this note, the Court ruled that states
may require a higher level of competency to exercise the Faretta right than the
level of competency required to stand trial.5  Unfortunately, the Court did not
specify what this higher standard must entail.6  As a result, the case creates a
substantial risk that judges may have too much discretion in determining that
a criminal defendant is incompetent to represent himself, curtailing the rather
broad right of self-representation enunciated in Faretta.
This note proceeds in three major steps.  Part II examines the key
precedents underlying Indiana v. Edwards, discussing the case’s foundational
concepts: the competency required to stand trial, the right to self-
representation in a criminal trial, and finally, a hybrid of the first two that
concerns the competency required to waive the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.  Part III introduces the principal case itself by providing a summary
of the relevant facts of the case, followed by an explanation of Justice Breyer’s
majority opinion and Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion.  Part IV argues that
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7. See Allen P. Wilkinson & Arthur C. Roberts, Defendant’s Competency to Stand Trial,
40 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 171, § 2 (1984).  
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 403 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part)
(“We must leave aside . . . any question whether a defendant is absolved of criminal
responsibility due to his mental state at the time he committed criminal acts . . . .  What is at
issue here is whether the defendant has sufficient competence to take part in a criminal
while the Edwards majority reached the correct result—that the Constitution
permits a state to impose a higher standard of competency to represent
oneself—the dissenting opinion also correctly points out that the lack of a clear
standard for determining the competency necessary for exercising the self-
representation right renders the majority opinion extraordinarily vague and
thereby risks trampling the right to self-representation altogether.  This section
then suggests that the Supreme Court should have adopted a “coherent
communication” standard to ensure that the Faretta right is curtailed only in
the most narrow and necessary of circumstances.  Part IV also critiques the
Edwards majority’s identification of certain additional cognitive abilities as
necessary for representing oneself, arguing instead that these abilities—which
are encompassed by the coherent communication standard—should represent
just a few of the factors relevant to competency analysis.  This section then
argues for a presumption of competence to represent oneself, rooted in the
competency to stand trial, and further posits that the coherent communication
standard would permit the trial judge to override this presumption and deny a
request for self-representation only where the defendant proves unable to
communicate a rational defense to the judge and jury.  Finally, Part IV also
summarizes existing protections that prevent trials from descending into farce
when a mentally ill defendant is allowed to defend himself.  Part V briefly
concludes this note.
II. Law Before the Case
A. Competency to Stand Trial
The question of a criminal defendant’s competency to stand trial is distinct
from the question of his mental state at the time the crime occurred.7  The fact
that a defendant formed, or was capable of forming, the mental state required
for a particular crime at the time he allegedly committed it does not mean that
he is competent at the time the trial commences.8  Similarly, questions about
whether the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the crime’s commission
have little to no bearing on whether the defendant is incompetent at the time
of the trial.9  In other words, competency is its own discrete inquiry.10
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proceeding and to make the decisions throughout its course.”).
11. 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).  The Court emphasized that it is insufficient for
the trial judge to find merely that the defendant is “oriented to time and place” and possesses
“some recollection of events.”  Id.
12. See 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966).
13. 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).
14. Id. at 164.
15. See id. at 166.
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 166-67.
19. Id. at 166.
20. Id. at 167.
The Supreme Court announced its current test for determining competency
to stand trial in Dusky v. United States, which held that a defendant must
possess both “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding” and “a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.”11  Furthermore, in Pate v.
Robinson, the Court held that “[w]here the evidence raises a ‘bona fide doubt’
as to a defendant’s competence to stand trial,” a competency hearing must be
conducted.12
The Court reaffirmed these holdings in Drope v. Missouri, reiterating that
“a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to
understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult
with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a
trial.”13  In Drope, the criminal defendant was accused of raping his wife.14  At
trial, his wife testified that the defendant had a history of mental illness and
that she had relayed this information to her husband’s attorney before the
trial.15  To illustrate the severity of his mental illness, she described occasions
where her husband had thrown himself down a flight of stairs at his home
when he did not get something that he wanted.16  She testified that while she
initially did not want to prosecute her husband, she changed her mind after he
attempted to choke her the day before the trial was to begin.17  During the
course of the trial, the defendant apparently attempted to commit suicide by
shooting himself and was unable to appear at the trial.18  His attorney moved
for a mistrial, but the judge denied the request because the defendant’s absence
was due to his own conduct.19  A jury subsequently convicted the defendant,
and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison.20
The Supreme Court overturned the defendant’s conviction, holding that the
trial court “must always be alert to circumstances suggesting . . . that . . . the
accused [is] unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial,”
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21. See id. at 181, 183.
22. Id. at 180.
23. See id. 
24. 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003).
25. Id. at 169.  Sell had a history of delusions, including beliefs that Communists had
contaminated the gold he used for fillings at his dental practice and that public officials,
including a state governor, were attempting to kill him.  See id. at 169-70.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 170.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 171.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 179.  The Court specified four conditions that must be met before the
administration of medication will be appropriate.  First, an important governmental interest
must be at stake.  Id. at 180.  The Court noted that the government has an interest in ensuring
including circumstances that arise after the trial has begun.21  While the Court
declined to hold that a suicide attempt during trial “create[s] a reasonable
doubt of competence to stand trial as a matter of law,”22 the Court nevertheless
concluded that in combination with the defendant’s behavior before the trial
and his wife’s testimony at trial, the suicide attempt generated sufficient doubt
regarding his competence to stand trial to demand further investigation into the
issue.23
While the trial court must be cognizant of the need to conduct competency
evaluations during all stages of the trial, it may also take affirmative measures
to ensure that the defendant is competent.  In Sell v. United States, the
Supreme Court held that, under certain conditions, a criminal defendant may
be administered medication, even involuntarily, to make him competent to
stand trial.24  Charles Sell was a dentist with a history of mental illness.25  He
was hospitalized several times and given antipsychotic medication.26
Eventually, he was indicted for mail and Medicare fraud in connection with
the filing of false insurance claims and later charged with attempted murder of
an FBI agent and a prosecution witness.27  
Sell requested that the magistrate evaluate his competency to stand trial.28
The magistrate granted Sell’s request and sent him to a federal medical center,
where the staff determined that Sell needed to take antipsychotic medication
to maintain his competency.29  When Sell refused to take the medication,
medical center staff requested permission to administer it involuntarily.30  The
Supreme Court ruled that the administration of antipsychotic medication to
ensure competence to stand trial is lawful, “but only if the treatment is
medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may
undermine the fairness of the trial, and . . . is necessary significantly to further
important governmental trial-related interests.”31
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both a timely prosecution and a fair trial for the defendant.  Id.  Second, involuntary medication
must “significantly further” the government’s interest.  Id. at 181.  Third, the medication must
be necessary to achieve the interest.  Id.  Finally, the medication must be “medically
appropriate” for the defendant’s specific medical condition.  Id.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
33. 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
34. Id. at 807-08.
35. Id. at 808-10.
36. Id. at 811-12.
37. Id. at 812, 836.
38. Id. at 819.
39. Id.; see also Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942) (noting
that “[t]he right to assistance of counsel” is accompanied by a “correlative right to dispense with
a lawyer’s help”); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) (stating that a defendant
may “supersede his lawyers altogether and conduct the trial himself”). 
B. The Right of Self-Representation
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part,
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”32
In Faretta v. California, the Court considered the issue of “whether a
defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without
counsel [and represent himself] when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to
do so.”33  Faretta was charged with grand theft in California state court and
was initially allowed to waive his right to counsel.34  After conducting a
hearing sua sponte, however, the trial judge reversed his original decision and
concluded that “Faretta had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his
right to the assistance of counsel, and . . . had no constitutional right to conduct
his own defense.”35  The judge appointed a public defender to the case, but a
jury subsequently convicted Faretta, and the California Court of Appeal
affirmed the conviction.36  
After the California Supreme Court denied review, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari and vacated the judgment,37 concluding that the right to
counsel embodied in the Sixth Amendment “does not provide merely that a
defense shall be made for the accused[, but] grants to the accused personally
the right to make his defense.”38  “[T]he right to self-representation,” the Court
explained, “is . . . necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment.”39
The Court reasoned that because the Sixth Amendment provides for assistance
of counsel, its “language and spirit . . . contemplate that counsel . . . shall be
an aid to a willing defendant—not an organ of the State interposed between an
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40. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 820-21.
43. Id. at 835.  The Court noted that Faretta’s “technical legal knowledge” was irrelevant
in determining whether he knowingly exercised the right to defend himself.  Id. at 836.
44. Id. at 834 n.46. 
45. See, e.g., Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152
(2000); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
46. 465 U.S. at 176.
47. See id. at 171-72.
48. Id. at 172.
49. Id. at 172-73.  For example, although Wiggins conducted cross-examination of
witnesses, he interrupted his questioning often to ask questions of standby counsel and allowed
counsel to make the opening statement and conduct voir dire of a witness.  Id. at 172.
50. Id. at 173.  Wiggins argued that “his Faretta right to present his defense pro se was
impaired by the distracting, intrusive, and unsolicited participation of counsel throughout the
trial.”  Id. at 176.
51. See id. at 173.
unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally.”40  To conclude
otherwise, the Court noted, would “violate[] the logic of the Amendment” and
risk transforming counsel from an “assistant” into a “master,”41 robbing the
defendant of the opportunity to present not just any defense, but his own
defense.42  In order for the criminal defendant to exercise his right to self-
representation, he must knowingly and intelligently do so after being informed
of the risks of self-representation.43
Although Faretta established the right of self-representation, the opinion
also emphasized that the right is not absolute and envisioned circumstances in
which the right might be cut off, such as where the defendant “deliberately
engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.”44  Since Faretta, the
Supreme Court has taken several opportunities to further limit the general
principle that the Sixth Amendment affords a criminal defendant the right to
represent himself.45  For example, in McKaskle v. Wiggins, the Court ruled that
Faretta intended “no absolute bar on standby counsel’s unsolicited
participation.”46  In Wiggins, Carl Wiggins requested appointed counsel to
assist him during his retrial for robbery charges, but later repudiated his
request and sought to proceed pro se.47  The court insisted that the appointed
counsel remain on standby at the trial, ready to provide assistance as needed.48
Wiggins willingly consulted with his standby counsel during the trial but
ultimately was convicted.49  Wiggins subsequently moved for a new trial,
contending that his standby counsel had “interfered with his presentation of his
defense.”50  After the trial court denied the motion, and Wiggins’s state court
appeals proved unavailing, Wiggins sought habeas corpus relief in federal




54. Id. at 184.
55. Id. at 178.
56. See 528 U.S. 152, 155 (2000).
57. Id. at 163.
58. Id. at 162.
59. See id. at 162-63.
60. Id. (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974)). 
ruled that his Faretta rights had been violated by the interference of standby
counsel.52  
The Supreme Court reversed.53  The Court held that the Sixth Amendment
is not violated by the appointment of standby counsel and also explained that
“[p]articipation by [standby] counsel to steer a defendant through the basic
procedures of trial is permissible even in the unlikely event that it somewhat
undermines the pro se defendant’s appearance of control over his own
defense.”54  The Court circumscribed this allowance, however, by stating that
standby counsel’s participation may not rob the defendant of “actual control”
of his defense and “should not be allowed to destroy the jury’s perception that
the defendant is representing himself.”55
The Court created another exception to the right of self-representation in
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, a case in
which a defendant wished to represent himself at the appellate level after being
convicted of embezzlement.56  There, the Court ruled that “neither the holding
nor the reasoning in Faretta requires [a state] to recognize a constitutional
right to self-representation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction.”57  The
Court reasoned that “the government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and
efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as
his own lawyer,”58 especially in the appellate context where the defendant is
no longer trying to rebut criminal charges but is instead attempting to reverse
his conviction.59  Unlike in the trial phase, where the defendant has been haled
into court against his will to respond to the charges of the prosecutor, “it is
ordinarily the defendant, rather than the State, who initiates the appellate
process, seeking not to fend off the efforts of the State’s prosecutor but rather
to overturn a finding of guilt made by a judge or a jury below.”60  In other
words, it is the autonomy afforded by the decision to present one’s own
defense, and to decide on the best strategy for doing so, that is the hallmark of
the self-representation right.  Such autonomy is less important at the appellate
phase, where review is typically confined to the record below and the
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61. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979).  Although a reviewing
court must determine “whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt[,] . . . this inquiry does not require a court to ‘ask itself whether it
believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’  Instead, the
relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. (footnote and citation omitted) (quoting Woodby v. INS, 385
U.S. 276, 282 (1966)).  In other words, the freedom of the criminal defendant to “conduct his
own cause in his own words,” Martinez, 528 U.S. at 158 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 823 (1975)), is less compelling at the appellate level, where the court does not accept new
evidence but merely tests the sufficiency of evidence produced at trial.
62. See discussion supra Part II.A.
63. See discussion supra Part II.B.
64. See 509 U.S. 389, 395 (1993).
65. Id. at 391.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 392.
68. Id. at 392-93.
69. Id. at 393.
70. Id.
reviewing court most often is searching only for significant constitutional
error.61
C. Competency and Self-Representation
While the Court clearly articulated the standard for competency to stand
trial in Dusky and Drope,62 and affirmed the right to waive the assistance of
counsel and proceed pro se in a criminal trial in Faretta,63 the Court did not
determine the competency standard for exercising the right to waive counsel
until Godinez v. Moran.64  In Godinez, the Court considered “whether the
competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is
higher than the competency standard for standing trial.”65
Richard Moran pleaded not guilty to three counts of first-degree murder and
was found competent to stand trial.66  Moran later informed the trial court that
he desired to waive his right to counsel and change his plea to guilty.67  After
advising Moran of the hazards of proceeding pro se and ensuring that he was
not pleading guilty for any improper reason, the court found that Moran
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, and accepted his
guilty plea.68  The court then sentenced Moran to death, and he petitioned for
post-conviction relief claiming that he had not been competent to plead guilty;
the court denied Moran’s petition on the basis that he had been found
competent to stand trial.69  After the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed his
appeal, Moran filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which the district court
denied.70  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s
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71. Id. at 393-94 (quoting Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1992)).
72. Id. at 398.
73. Id. at 398-99.
74. Id. at 399.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 402.
78. See 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008).
denial of the petition, concluding that “[c]ompetency to waive constitutional
rights . . . requires a higher level of mental functioning than that required to
stand trial.”71
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, “reject[ing] the notion that
competence to plead guilty or to waive the right to counsel must be measured
by a standard that is higher than . . . the Dusky standard.”72  Justice Thomas,
writing for the majority, could “conceive of no basis for demanding a higher
level of competence for those defendants who choose to plead guilty,” because
“the decision to plead guilty is . . . no more complicated than the sum total of
decisions that a defendant may be called upon to make during the course of a
trial.”73  In other words, the Court determined that if Dusky’s competency
standard is sufficient for the purposes of pleading not guilty and proceeding
to trial, “it is necessarily adequate for those who plead guilty.”74  
The Court further concluded that waiving the right to counsel does not
require more competence than electing not to do so, because this decision does
not “require[] an appreciably higher level of mental functioning than the
decision to waive other constitutional rights.”75  The Court dodged the
argument that representing oneself at trial requires a different set of mental
capabilities than those required when standing trial with counsel by confining
its analysis merely to “the competence to waive the right, not the competence
to represent [one]self.”76  Finally, Justice Thomas concluded by noting that
“while States are free to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate
than the Dusky formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose these
additional requirements.”77
III. Indiana v. Edwards
A. Facts of the Case
In Indiana v. Edwards, the State of Indiana accepted the invitation extended
by Justice Thomas in Godinez to adopt a heightened standard of competency
for self-representation.78  Ahmad Edwards was charged with several criminal
offenses, including attempted murder, battery with a deadly weapon, and
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85. Id. at 2382-83.
86. Id. at 2390 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 2383 (majority opinion).
88. Id.
89. Edwards v. State, 866 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2007) (“The record in this case presents
a substantial basis to agree with the trial court and thus presents an opportunity to revisit the
holdings of Faretta and Godinez, if the Supreme Court of the United States decides that is to
be done. However, as it stands today, we are bound by these authorities as Supreme Court
precedent.”), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008).
90. Id.  Curiously, the Indiana Supreme Court arrived at this conclusion without even
mentioning Godinez’s authorization of a higher standard of competency to represent oneself
beyond that required to stand trial.  See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993); see also
supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
91. See Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2383.
theft.79  Initially, Edwards was found incompetent to stand trial, but later his
condition improved and he was deemed competent to stand trial.80
Immediately before trial, Edwards sought to represent himself and requested
a continuance to prepare to proceed pro se.81  His request for a continuance
was denied, so Edwards proceeded to trial with counsel.82  A jury convicted
Edwards of theft but did not reach a verdict on the attempted murder and
battery charges.83  
The State of Indiana sought to retry Edwards for attempted murder and
battery, and Edwards again requested permission to represent himself.84  The
court denied this request, finding that although Edwards was competent to
stand trial, he was not competent to defend himself.85  Notably, the court
arrived at this finding “without explaining precisely what abilities Edwards
lacked.”86  Edwards was subsequently convicted.87  Indiana’s intermediate
appellate court determined that “the trial court’s refusal to permit [Edwards]
to represent himself at his retrial deprived him of his constitutional right of
self-representation” and ordered a new trial.88
Citing Faretta and Godinez, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the
intermediate court’s decision, although it expressed ambivalence about doing
so.89  The court noted that Edwards had been found competent to stand trial;
therefore, “he had a constitutional right to proceed pro se and it was reversible
error to deny him that right on the ground that he was incapable of presenting
his defense.”90  The State of Indiana appealed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.91
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92. Id. at 2385-86.
93. Id. at 2383.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 2383-84.
96. See id. at 2384-85.




B. The Supreme Court’s Decision
The issue the Court considered in Edwards was whether a state may
constitutionally insist upon representation at a criminal defendant’s trial if the
defendant’s diminished mental capacity renders him unable to conduct his own
defense.92  The Court began its discussion by noting that the Court’s
precedents “frame[d] the question presented, but they [did] not answer it.”93
The Court then summarized the holdings in Dusky and Drope but pointed out
that “[n]either case considered . . . the relation of the mental competence
standard to the right of self-representation.”94  The Court also reviewed Faretta
but noted that the self-representation right is not absolute and that Faretta “did
not consider the problem of mental competency.”95  The Court then considered
Godinez and, while acknowledging similarities, concluded that it did not
answer the question before the Court, because Godinez concerned whether a
higher competency standard is required to plead guilty, not whether a higher
competency standard is necessary in “seek[ing] to measure the defendant’s
ability to conduct trial proceedings.”96
The Court answered the issue presented in the affirmative for three reasons.
First, the Court reasoned that its own existing precedent pointed toward an
affirmative answer.97  Because the Dusky and Drope standard for competency
to stand trial requires that the defendant be able to consult with counsel and
assist in his defense, the Court concluded that competency to exercise the
Faretta right necessarily must be different because it assumes a situation in
which there is no attorney to consult and assist.98  
Second, the Court recognized that “[m]ental illness itself is not a unitary
concept” and that this fact militated against the use of a single mental
competency standard.99  The Court acknowledged that there are many kinds
and degrees of mental illnesses, and they can “interfere[] with an individual’s
functioning at different times in different ways.”100  Thus, while a particular
mental illness may not prevent a defendant from being competent to stand
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101. See id. at 2386-87 (quoting, inter alia, Brief for the American Psychiatric Ass’n and
American Academy of Psychiatry & the Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 26,
Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (No. 07-208), 2008 WL 405546, at *26 [hereinafter APA Amicus
Brief]).
102. Id. at 2387 (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984)).
103. Id.
104. See id. at 2387-88 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 2388 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 20, Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (No. 07-208),
2008 WL 336303, at *20 (emphasis omitted)).
106. Id.  The Court appears to have declined to adopt the coherent communication
competency standard as an act of judicial restraint, but it failed to recognize that such restraint
often produces nothing more than “judicial obfuscation.”  Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right
to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 498 n.7 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).  As Justice Scalia makes clear in his dissenting opinion, the failure to adopt the
coherent communication standard risks allowing trial judges to dispense with a Faretta
competency evaluation altogether—by simply referencing the majority’s allowance of a
heightened competency standard.  See discussion infra Part III.C. 
107. See Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2388.
trial, it may nevertheless “impair the defendant’s ability to play the
significantly expanded role required for self-representation.”101  
Third, the Court determined that allowing a defendant who does not possess
the requisite mental capacity to represent himself fails to “affirm the dignity”
of that defendant.102  The defendant may be deprived of his dignity, not only
because his self-representation could result in a “spectacle,” but also because
his “lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction or sentence,”
undermining “the most basic of the Constitution’s criminal law
objectives—providing a fair trial.”103  For all of these reasons, the Court
concluded that while the Constitution does not require a higher standard of
competency to represent oneself, it does “permit[] States to insist upon
representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under
Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they
are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.”104
Although the Court found that states may require a higher standard of
competency for self-representation, it refused to adopt Indiana’s suggested
standard for denying the Faretta right—that a criminal defendant’s right to
represent himself may be denied “where the defendant cannot communicate
coherently with the court or a jury.”105  The Court rejected the standard because
it was “uncertain . . . as to how that particular standard would work in
practice.”106  The State of Indiana also requested that the Court, if it declined
to adopt the coherent communication standard as a limitation on Faretta,
consider overruling Faretta entirely.107  The Court also declined this request,
however, noting that while some members of the Court previously had called
its wisdom into question, recent empirical research indicates that Faretta does
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108. See id. (quoting Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An
Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 428 (2007)).
109. Id. at 2390-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. See id. at 2392.  Scalia observed that “Edwards . . . was respectful and compliant and
did not provide a basis to conclude a trial could not have gone forward had he been allowed to
press his own claims.”  Id.
111. See id. (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984)).  Recall that although
standby counsel may be appointed to assist the pro se defendant, this appointment must not
“destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself.”  Wiggins, 465 U.S.
at 178.  It is also worth noting that while Scalia did not mention the Martinez holding, his
reasoning appears consistent with the appointment of counsel, over a defendant’s objection, in
the context of  appellate proceedings, as such proceedings do not involve the presentation of the
case to the jury.  See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152
(2000); see also supra text accompanying notes 56-61. 
112. See Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2392-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
113. See id. at 2387 (majority opinion); see also supra text accompanying note 103.
114. See Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2393 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. See id. at 2392-93.
not commonly produce unfair trial proceedings and that pro se state felony
defendants, compared to their “represented counterparts[,] . . . [are] less likely
to [be] convicted of felonies.”108
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia saw the issue in more clear-cut terms.  In his view, at the trial
phase, “a State simply may not force a lawyer upon a criminal defendant who
wishes to conduct his own defense.”109  Justice Scalia conceded that the Court
had allowed for such an imposition in the case of obstructionist misconduct,
but argued that Edwards did not fall within the reach of that exception.110  He
also recognized that the Court had limited the Faretta right by allowing the
appointment of standby counsel but argued that these exceptions “never
constrained the ability of a defendant to retain ‘actual control over the case he
chooses to present to the jury.’”111 
Justice Scalia also attacked the rationale given in Justice Breyer’s majority
opinion that guaranteeing the fairness of the trial enhanced the defendant’s
dignity.112 arguing that while dignity underlies the self-representation right, the
loss of dignity comes not from the spectacle that results from a defendant
representing himself poorly,113 but from robbing the defendant of an
opportunity to be the “master of [his] fate rather than a ward of the State.”114
To Justice Scalia, the fundamental basis of Faretta’s holding was that although
the Sixth Amendment seeks to ensure a fair trial by guaranteeing assistance of
counsel, this guarantee should not be used to denigrate the right of self-
representation provided by the Sixth Amendment.115  Justice Scalia viewed the
dignity of the defendant as inextricably intertwined with the autonomy to
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choose to reject the assistance of counsel and proceed pro se.116  Using the
ideas of fairness and dignity to deny the right of self-representation turned the
basis of the right on its head.  The majority’s result could be obtained only by
“abstract[ing]” to the purpose of the Sixth Amendment to ensure a fair trial,
then using this purpose to eliminate a right for which the Sixth Amendment
provides.117
Finally, Justice Scalia attacked the vagueness of the majority opinion.  He
condemned the majority for refusing to adopt Indiana’s coherent communication
standard for denying self-representation.118  This “indeterminacy,” he argued,
“makes a bad holding worse” by converting the right of self-representation for
the mentally ill into a “sometime thing.”119  Specifically, he was concerned that
the majority opinion would create a dangerous incentive for trial judges to avoid
the “painful necessity” of managing how a questionably competent pro se
defendant conducts his defense by simply “appointing knowledgeable and
literate counsel.”120
IV. In Defense of the Coherent Communication Standard
The Supreme Court missed an opportunity to issue a clear standard for
determining competency to proceed pro se by refusing to adopt the coherent
communication standard offered by the State of Indiana.  Accordingly, the
Court should revisit its decision, sooner rather than later, to prevent trial courts
from relying on a patchwork of vague justifications to support denial of the
self-representation right.  In the interim, lower courts, when accepting the
Court’s invitation to require a higher level of competence for self-
representation, should utilize the coherent communication standard.
As Justice Scalia forcefully argued, the lack of a definitive standard to
which states must adhere when deciding to require a demonstration of elevated
competency risks eliminating the Faretta right for an entire subsection of the
population.121  “[C]ourts must indulge every reasonable presumption against
the loss of constitutional rights,”122 and the right to self-representation is no
different—it should be eliminated only upon the clearest showing that the
defendant lacks the competence necessary to present a coherent defense.  An
unambiguous standard would assist courts in ensuring that their refusals to
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allow defendants to represent themselves are supported by sufficient evidence
of incompetence to overcome the presumption against the loss of constitutional
rights.
This Part begins with a brief description of the coherent communication
standard.  It then proceeds to discuss the majority’s justification for requiring
a higher level of competency to represent oneself, with particular emphasis on
the so-called “functional abilities” required to conduct trial proceedings.  It
argues that requiring many of these functional abilities contradicts existing
Supreme Court precedent that rejects the possession of technical legal
knowledge and skills as a prerequisite to exercising the right of self-
representation.  Additionally, recognizing that some of the functional abilities
may be necessary to represent oneself, this part explains how the coherent
communication standard accounts for the truly requisite functional abilities
and thus why utilizing the standard would necessarily include consideration
of them.  Next, this Part argues that the inclusion of these functional abilities
in the coherent communication standard should establish, at a minimum, a
presumption of competency to represent oneself and that the transparency of
using a clear standard would ensure that trial judges engage in a particularized
examination of each defendant and do not deny the right of self-representation
based on a monolithic conception of mental illness.  To the extent that some
still harbor fears that some defendants will be unable to adequately represent
themselves, this Part also summarizes additional protections like the
availability of standby counsel and the prohibition on the disruption of court
proceedings that can prevent trials from becoming farcical.
A. The Coherent Communication Standard Remains Faithful to Faretta
The coherent communication standard posits that “a trial court may deny a
criminal defendant the right to represent himself at trial where the defendant
cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury.”123  Indiana derived
this standard from the Wisconsin Supreme Court case of State v. Klessig.124
In Klessig, the defendant was charged with jumping bail and participating in
a burglary.125  The defendant informed the court of his intention to proceed pro
se, but the trial court failed to conduct a separate hearing regarding Klessig’s
competence to represent himself.126  The Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled
that the trial court must conduct a separate inquiry because the competence
necessary to stand trial is not the same as that required to proceed without
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counsel.127  Further, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the trial court
should determine if any “psychological disability . . . may significantly affect
[the defendant’s] ability to communicate a possible defense to the jury.”128
The court noted that its coherence standard “should not prevent persons of
average ability and intelligence from representing themselves unless a specific
problem or disability can be identified which may prevent a meaningful
defense from being offered.”129  The coherent communication standard adopted
by Wisconsin thus remains faithful to Faretta by allowing defendants, even
those without legal knowledge or formal education, to represent themselves as
long as no mental illness or defect prevents them from articulating a defense
to the jury.
B. The Court’s Justifications for an Elevated Level of Competency Lack
Precedential Support
The majority opinion in Edwards isolated a few additional skills necessary
for self-representation, over and above those required to stand trial.  The Court
distinguished these additional “functional” abilities from the “decisional”
abilities reflected in the Dusky standard.130  Decisional abilities include the
ability to consult with an attorney about the best strategy to employ during
trial,131 as well as the ability to waive counsel and plead guilty.132  By contrast,
functional abilities include “organization of defense, making motions, arguing
points of law, participating in voir dire, questioning witnesses, and addressing
the court and jury.”133  This is how the Court was able to distinguish Godinez
from Edwards.  Godinez concerned only the defendant’s competence to decide
to plead to guilty without the aid of counsel, while Edwards involved the
defendant’s “ability to conduct trial proceedings.”134  Justice Breyer’s opinion
accepted the argument that common symptoms of mental illnesses, such as
2010] NOTES 161
135. See id. at 2387 (quoting APA Amicus Brief, supra note 101, at 26).
136. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975) (“[T]echnical legal knowledge . .
. [is] not relevant to an assessment of [a defendant’s] knowing exercise of the right to defend
himself.”).
137. See id. (“We need make no assessment of how well or poorly [a defendant] ha[s]
mastered the intricacies of the . . . provisions that govern challenges of potential jurors on voir
dire.”).
138. 128 S. Ct. at 2394 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
disorganized thinking, difficulty maintaining focus and concentration, and
anxiety, can preclude the defendant from adequately exercising these
functional abilities.135
The central problem with using the distinction between decisional and
functional abilities—at least as they are articulated in the majority opinion—as
the basis for requiring a higher level of competency to represent oneself is that
some of the functional abilities enumerated by the majority are without any
precedential support and contradict the reasoning of Faretta and its progeny.
Many of these “abilities” would be more appropriately classified as examples
of legal knowledge—knowledge of the sort that the Faretta opinion explicitly
contemplated and rejected as prerequisite to exercising the self-representation
right.136  For example, implicit in the ability to argue points of law is an
assumption that the defendant possesses an adequate foundation of legal
knowledge from which to argue those points.  Moreover, the ability to
effectively participate in voir dire requires that the defendant possess certain
legal expertise explicitly rejected by the Court in Faretta.137  By requiring these
functional abilities, the majority in Edwards risks overruling key portions of
Faretta sub silentio by repackaging these so-called abilities, freighted as they
are with certain legal knowledge requirements, as necessary conditions for
adequate competence.  
The majority opinion thus imposes a unique requirement on the mentally ill
that is expressly forbidden with respect to those assumed to be competent.  As
Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in Edwards, “[T]he Court’s opinion does not
even have the questionable virtue of being politically correct.  At a time when
all society is trying to mainstream the mentally impaired, the Court permits
them to be deprived of a basic constitutional right,” unlike any other
subsection of the population.138
C. The Coherent Communication Standard Encompasses the Functional
Abilities Identified by the Edwards Majority and Should Establish a
Presumption of Competency to Exercise the Right of Self-Representation 
Admittedly, not all of the functional abilities specified by the Court require
legal knowledge.  For example, the ability to organize a defense, make
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motions, and argue the case to the judge or jury do not demand sophisticated
legal skills.  Nevertheless, the coherent communication standard should have
allayed the fear expressed by the majority—that it would be unworkable in
practice—because most, if not all, of the functional requirements posited by
the Court necessitate coherent communication.  For instance, making motions,
arguing points of law, questioning witnesses and potential jurors, and speaking
to a judge or jury all require logical communication, whether written or oral.
In other words, the coherent communication standard ensures that the denial
of the right of self-representation occurs in “circumstances where the
defendant cannot, in the most basic functional terms, actually do what self-
representation presumes he can do.”139
At a minimum, rather than allowing trial judges to require a standardless,
heightened level of competency, there should be a presumption that the
defendant, having been found competent to stand trial, possesses the
communication skills necessary to present a coherent argument to the court or
jury.  After all, there is significant overlap between the coherent
communication standard and the Dusky standard of competency to stand trial:
both assume that the defendant possesses the ability to communicate.140  As far
as the fact of communication is concerned, the difference lies merely in who
is the immediate recipient of the defendant’s communication: the competency
to stand trial requires communication between the defendant and counsel,
while the competency to represent oneself would require communication with
the trier of fact.  This crucial similarity suggests the need for a presumption
that a defendant is competent to represent himself, and the coherent
communication standard would allow the trial judge to override this
presumption only by referencing particularized examples that prove that the
defendant is entirely unable to defend himself.  Judges could not simply make
reference to the defendant’s history of mental illness, using that history as a
blanket excuse to deny a constitutionally-protected right.  
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D. The Coherent Communication Standard Would Guarantee a
Particularized Inquiry, Requiring the Clearest Evidence to Justify Any
Judicial Override of the Competency Presumption 
The coherent communication standard would strike an appropriate balance
between the sometimes competing purposes of the Sixth Amendment:
protecting the autonomy of the individual on the one hand and ensuring the
fairness of the trial proceeding on the other.  It would do so by guaranteeing
a particularized inquiry into the defendant’s abilities and permit denial of the
right to self-representation only when observable behavior of the defendant
suggests that she can no longer present a coherent defense.141  In this way, the
standard ensures that a trial court cannot eliminate the constitutional right to
self-representation merely by invoking the defendant’s mental illness, instead
requiring empirical proof that the mental illness actually precludes the
defendant from communicating coherently to the court or a jury.  
The Edwards case itself reveals the legitimate need for such a requirement,
as the trial judge apparently denied Edwards the right to represent himself
“without explaining precisely what abilities Edwards lacked”142—referring at
most to psychiatric reports that presented contradictory data on the question
of Edwards’ competency to represent himself.143  Mental competency is not
unitary, as the majority opinion pointed out,144 and medication can restore
competency, as recognized in Sell v. United States.145  Simply citing a history
of mental illness may fail to take account of a defendant’s rehabilitation
through medication and also risks jettisoning the requirement that competency
be measured at the time of trial rather than at some point in the past.146
Allowing the trial judge to assume that the defendant is competent to stand
trial but incompetent to represent himself reinstates a monolithic notion of
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mental illness that the majority in Edwards ostensibly rejected.147  Without a
standard to which to refer, the trial judge may ignore the particularities of a
defendant’s mental condition and simply deny the self-representation right.
The need to understand and appreciate the complexities of each defendant’s
mental condition is all the more important in cases like Edwards where the
defendant’s competence is in dispute because of conflicting evidence.
Some may argue that the process suggested above jeopardizes the efficiency
of judicial proceedings.  There is likely some truth to such fears, but the
interest in judicial efficiency must be weighed against the autonomy of the
defendant who wishes to represent herself—a right guaranteed to her by the
Constitution of the United States.
E. Existing Protections Minimize the Dangers of Incompetent Self-
Representation
Other safeguards already in place prevent the denigration of dignity and
frustration of fairness hypothesized in the Edwards majority opinion.148  As
McKaskle v. Wiggins makes clear, courts may require the presence of standby
counsel to assist a pro se defendant.149  Instead of wholly denying a defendant
an opportunity to demonstrate that she can adequately represent herself, as the
majority opinion in effect allows, a court could simply appoint standby
counsel to assist the defendant if she encounters problems during voir dire or
the questioning of witnesses.  Although those with mental illnesses may
experience problems focusing or concentrating while representing themselves,
the first instance of such a problem should not be automatic grounds for
cutting off the self-representation right when standby counsel could easily
provide the defendant with guidance concerning the matter she is having
difficulty coherently explaining.
If the defendant continues to suffer problems focusing or communicating
coherently, prohibitions on disruptive behavior that courts have already
established could be expanded to encompass disruptions caused by a
defendant’s mental illness.  Recall that Faretta recognized the authority of the
trial judge to terminate self-representation by defendants who deliberately
engage in obstructionist misconduct.150  Moreover, in Illinois v. Allen, the
Court held that the right to remain in the courtroom and confront witnesses
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could be forfeited if a defendant repeatedly engages in disruptive behavior,
making it impossible for trial to continue.151  
Admittedly, neither of these cases involved someone with a mental illness,
but rather someone who willfully ignored a judge’s order to cease being
disruptive.  Nevertheless, the same logic applies to situations involving a
mentally ill defendant.  Initial missteps by the pro se defendant should not
automatically mean that she is no longer able to represent herself; instead,
standby counsel should step in to assist her in maintaining coherence.  If that
assistance fails, however, and the defendant continues to exhibit difficulties
expressing herself clearly to the judge or jury, or asks inappropriate questions
of a witness, this behavior would be akin to a willful disruption and deliberate
obstruction because it would preclude the trial from continuing.  In such a
scenario, it would be appropriate for the trial judge to appoint counsel to take
over so that the trial could continue.
V. Conclusion
The requirement that a defendant be competent to stand trial and the right
of self-representation reflect sometimes-conflicting goals of the judicial
system.  On the one hand, competency evaluations ensure that the judicial
process is fair, while on the other, the right of self-representation affords
autonomy to the individual to be the master of his destiny.  When a potentially
incompetent defendant seeks to represent himself, courts must determine how
to ensure a fair trial for that defendant without robbing him of his Sixth
Amendment rights.  This dilemma calls for a careful approach by the courts to
make sure that they deny a defendant his Faretta right of self-representation
only when absolutely necessary to ensure fairness.
Indiana v. Edwards affords judges the power to require a heightened level
of competency for self-representation, but its failure to issue a concrete
standard for determining that higher level of competency risks weakening the
self-representation right.  Justice Scalia rightly noted in his dissent that trial
judges may avoid the burdensome task of determining the defendant’s level of
competency by simply referencing the defendant’s history of mental illness
and asserting that the indeterminate higher standard has not been met.  While
courts must surely prevent truly incompetent defendants from representing
themselves, they should do so only after sufficiently explaining why a
defendant’s level of competency is high enough for him to stand trial but not
high enough for him to represent himself.  A clear standard requiring that the
defendant be able to coherently communicate would help in this regard.
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The coherent communication standard alleviates many of the problems
associated with self-representation by potentially incompetent defendants.
While conducting trial proceedings does require additional faculties above
those needed to stand trial, all of them can be distilled into a common
requirement that the defendant be able to communicate logical thoughts and
arguments to the court.  Only at the point when the defendant demonstrates his
incapacity to mount a coherent defense should he be denied his right of self-
representation.
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